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RED OWL'S LEGACY
GREGORY M. DUHL*

In the early 1960s, Joseph Hoffman, a high school graduate, baker and
father of seven, sought to obtain a Red Owl grocery store franchise in
Wisconsin. He entered into negotiations with Red Owl Stores, Inc.
after the franchisor assured him that the $18,000 he had to invest in
the franchise was sufficient. Over the course of the negotiations, Red
Owl encouraged Hoffman to sell his bakery, buy a small grocery store
to gain experience in the grocery business, sell his grocery store three
months later, and move his family to the desired location for his Red
Owl franchise. The negotiations fell apart after Red Owl raised the
amount of the investment required of Hoffman beyond what he could
afford. Hoffman lost his bakery business and lost the franchise that he
coveted. Despite the fact that Hoffman and Red Owl had yet to enter
into a contract, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores, Inc. fashioned liability for Hoffman around the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. That Supreme Court decision and its aftermath
are Red Owl's legacy.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
offered unprecedented protection for the interests of potential franchisees. In
the absence of any contractual obligation on the part of franchisors to
prospective franchise owners, the court boldly invoked the doctrine of
promissory estoppel to recognize the economic risks that individuals take
Honorable Abraham L. Freedman Fellow and Lecturer in Law, James E. Beasley
School of
Law, Temple University. B.A. 1991, Yale College; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School. I thank
William J. Woodward, Jr., an inspiring mentor and friend, for giving me the opportunity to teach
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. (Red Owl) to his first-year contracts class, and Richard K.
Greenstein for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. I also acknowledge the exceptional
research assistance of Audrey K. Bowen and Damian M. Taranto. Last, I could not have written this
article without the wonderful insights I discovered in Contracts: Law in Action, by Stewart
Macaulay, John Kidwell, and William Whitford. The authors of this casebook deserve much credit
for shaping how we teach and learn about Red Owl.
1. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). The seven justices on the Red Owl Court were Hon. George
R. Currie, Chief Justice (b. Jan. 16, 1900 - d. June 9, 1983); Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild, Senior Judge,
United States District Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (b. Dec. 25, 1912 - ); Hon. Harold E.
Hallows (b. Apr. 20, 1904 - d. Sept. 11, 1974); Hon. Myron L. Gordon (b. Feb. 11, 1918 - ); Hon.
Horace W. Wilkie (b. Jan. 9, 1917 - d. May 23, 1976); Hon. Bruce F. Beilfuss (b. Jan. 8, 1915 Aug. 18, 1986); and Hon. Nathan F. Heffernan (b. Aug. 6, 1920 -).
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when negotiating for the extension of a franchise.2 By pinning certain
responsibilities on franchisors during such negotiations, the court corrected
the unequal bargaining power between the corporate franchisor and the
potential franchisee. In that regard, the decision was a victory for the
"powerless" and a loss for the "powerful"-a victory for small entrepreneurs
in their struggle against corporate greed.
Thousands of first-year law students have read Red Owl to learn about
promissory estoppel, and courts in Wisconsin and elsewhere have cited the
case as precedent for imposing liability on promisors. But even though the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin cloaked its Red Owl decision in the fabric of
promissory estoppel, the theory does not explain why the court imposed
liability when the franchisor made no "actionable" promise, or why the court
did not instruct the trial judge to award damages sufficient to protect the
Hoffmans' reliance interest. 3 Interpreting Red Owl merely as a case about
promissory estoppel masks what was truly daring about the court's opinion in
Red Owl, as well as the decision's unfulfilled legacy.
The court in Red Owl recognized the need to rectify a clear injustice and
used promissory estoppel as its vehicle to do so. In light of the poor fit
between promissory estoppel and the facts of the case, a very small number of
courts and legal scholars have interpreted the court's decision in Red Owl as
establishing a precontractual duty on the part of franchisors to negotiate in
Under that interpretation, a franchisor's precontractual
good faith.4
assurances and representations to a potential franchisee are not enforceable as
promises, but rather are actionable in tort if made in bad faith. The
interpretation is problematic, however, because the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin did not explicitly recognize such a duty in Red Owl or in any case
thereafter, and it narrowed the scope of the promissory estoppel doctrine in
subsequent decisions.5 Unfortunately, such problems have clouded the
significance of the decision for potential franchisees and employees, as well
as for many first-year law students who have read the court's opinion in their
contracts casebooks.

2. See id. at 274.
3. See id.at 276-77.
4. See, e.g., Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1987); Werner v. Xerox
Corp., 732 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1984); Vigoda v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 646 P.2d 900 (Colo.
1982); Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and Precontractual
Liability, 12 TUL. EUR. & CWv. L.F. 97, 133-35 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Goff v. Mass. Protective Ass'n, Inc., 176 N.W.2d 576 (Wis. 1970); Landess v.
Borden, Inc., 667 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1981); Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 663 N.W.2d 715
(Wis. 2003); Pederson v. Anibas, 635 N.W.2d 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (unpublished opinion);
Voyager Village Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Johnson, 295 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
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The 150th anniversary of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is the perfect
time to re-examine the heralded and unheralded legacies of Red Owl. In this
Article, I do not pretend to rewrite history, but try to re-examine the Red Owl
decision and its impact. Such a history not only highlights both the court's
inventiveness and shortsightedness but also it provides insight into the role
courts play in American society. Rather than taking Red Owl out of contracts
class and moving it to torts, we should use this occasion to appreciate all that
Red Owl has contributed to the study of contract law over the past four
decades.
In Part II, I present the background to Red Owl in addition to the decision
itself and its aftermath. Part III discusses the impact of Red Owl on the
development of franchise law and its more general impact on the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and precontractual business relationships. Part IV
explains why the case does not fit the promissory estoppel rubric and
speculates why the court relied upon that doctrine regardless. It also describes
the ways in which the facts of the case better fit a theory grounded in tort for
breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith. Part V examines instances when
courts and scholars have interpreted Red Owl as establishing such a duty and
discusses the benefits and drawbacks of reading the case in that way. This
Article concludes by revisiting the lessons that lawyers, law professors, and
law students can draw from Red Owl.
II. HOFFMAN V. RED OWL STORES, INC.
In 1965, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc.6 The question before the court was whether a prospective
franchisee had a cause of action against a franchisor whose actions were
inconsistent with specific, but noncontractual, assurances made during
negotiations over the extension of a franchise.7 The court's efforts to
compensate potential franchisees for some of the losses they incur in relying
on such assurances have affected franchise law as well as employment and
business law more generally. While it is possible to criticize the decision in
hindsight as shortsighted, a contextual understanding of the case reminds us of
how radical the court's position truly was.
A.

The Facts

The plaintiffs were Joseph Hoffman (Hoffman) and his wife, a couple
who owned and operated a bakery in Wautoma, Wisconsin, from late 1956

6. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
7. See id. at 267.
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until they sold the building in late 1961.8 Hoffman, a high school graduate
with a year of vocational training in business, was in his twenties when the
couple opened the bakery. 9 He and his wife had seven children.' 0
In November 1959, Hoffman, wishing to expand operations by opening a
grocery store, contacted the defendant, Red Owl Stores, Inc. (Red Owl), a
Minnesota corporation that owned and operated a chain of grocery stores in
the Midwest. 1" Red Owl also extended franchises to individuals, partnerships,
and corporations.1 2 During 1960, Hoffman and Red Owl began negotiations
for Hoffman to open a Red Owl franchise in Wautoma. 13 In the fall of that
year, Hoffman informed Edward Lukowitz, a divisional manager for Red
Owl, that he had $18,000 available for capital to invest in the franchise, and
Lukowitz assured him14 that such an investment was more than sufficient to
open a Red Owl store.
In late 1960, Hoffman thought that he should buy a small grocery store in
Wautoma to gain experience before owning a Red Owl franchise. 5 After
seeking and obtaining Lukowitz's approval, Hoffman purchased and began
operating a grocery store.' 6 Three months later when Red Owl representatives
found that the store was profitable, 17 Lukowitz advised Hoffman to sell the
store.' 8 Although reluctant to sacrifice the summer tourist business, Hoffman
sold the grocery store in June 1961 after Lukowitz assured him that he would
be operating a larger Red Owl store by fall.19 Lukowicz also reconfirmed that
Hoffman could open a franchise with only $18,000 in capital.20
In the fall of 1961, following the franchisor's suggestion, Hoffman
exercised an option to purchase a lot in Chilton, Wisconsin, on which to build
his Red Owl store. 2 1 Hoffman gave a $1000 deposit toward the purchase
8. Id. at 268-69.
9. See STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW FN ACTION 401 (2d ed. 2003).
10. Id.
11. Red Owl, 133 N.W.2d at 269.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 270. The full price of the lot was $6000, and upon electing to purchase the lot,
Hoffman owed the entire balance within thirty days. Id. at 269-70. Red Owl had planned for a third
party to buy the lot from Hoffman, construct a building, and then lease the lot to Hoffman for $550 a
month. Id. at 270. The lease was to run for ten years, and at the end of the lease, Hoffman would
have had the option to renew the lease or buy the property. Id.
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22
price. A couple of months later, Lukowitz advised the potential franchisee
to sell his bakery building as the final step to obtaining a Red Owl franchise.23
On November 6, 1961, the Hoffmans sold their bakery building but kept the
bakery equipment in anticipation of opening a bakery within their Red Owl

store.24

Hoffman sold the building, moved his family to Neenah where he rented a
house, and took a job working the night shift at an Appleton bakery, only to
learn from Red Owl officials in late November 1961 that he needed $24,100
in capital to open a Red Owl franchise. 25 Red Owl raised the figure again to
$26,000, claiming that the additional investment was needed for promotional
endeavors. 26 Hoffman's father-in-law agreed to contribute $13,000 of the
start-up capital under the condition that he be made a partner in the business.2 7
Lukowitz told Hoffman that a partnership "sound[ed] fine, 28 only for Red
Owl later to reject the partnership and require Hoffman's father-in-law to
"either [as] a gift or a loan subordinate to all general
make his 2investment
9
creditors.
In the first few months of 1962, Red Owl provided Hoffman with
financial statements that Hoffman interpreted as requiring him and his fatherin-law to invest $34,000 in the grocery store. 30 Red Owl made no further
mention of Hoffman's father-in-law signing a subordination agreement and
as a gift. 3 1 At that point,
instead insisted that he make his investment
32
Owl.
Hoffman broke off negotiations with Red
B. ProceduralHistory
The Hoffmans filed a lawsuit against Red Owl in the Circuit Court of
Outagamie County, Wisconsin, to recover "for the breach of [Red Owl's]
representations and agreements" related to the Hoffmans' potential acquisition
of a Red Owl franchise.3 3 The plaintiffs grounded their complaint on the

22. Id.
23. Id. In November 1961, Hoffman sold his bakery building for $10,000.
was owned in joint tenancy by Hoffman and his wife. Id. at 276.
24. Id. at 270.
25. Id. at 269-70, 276.
26. Id. at 270.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 271.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 268-69.
33. Id. at 269.

Id. The building
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theory of promissory estoppel. 34 After the trial, the court submitted the case
to the jury for a special verdict. 35 The jury found all of the elements necessary
for liability present, which enabled the court to find Red Owl liable to the
Hoffmans under the plaintiffs' theory of recovery.3 6 The jury also found that
Red Owl should pay the Hoffmans the following amounts in damages:
$16,735 for the sale of the Wautoma grocery store; $2000 for the sale of the
bakery building; $1000 for the down payment to exercise the option on the
Chilton building site; $140 for the costs incurred in the move to Neenah; and
$125 for the house they rented.37
The Hoffmans moved for judgment on the special verdict, and Red Owl
moved that the court change the jury's answers to the questions related to
liability from "Yes" to "No," and, in the alternative, relieve Red Owl of the
jury's recommended damage awards or order a new trial.3 8 On March 31,
1964, the trial judge ordered the parties to submit to a new trial on the sole
issue of how much Red Owl should compensate the Hoffmans for the sale of
their Wautoma grocery store and adopted the rest of the jury's verdict. 39 Red
Owl appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the
Hoffmans cross-appealed the order for a new trial.4 °
C. The Supreme Court's Holding
In Hoffnan v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court of Wisconsin set
out to answer three questions:
(1) Whether this court should recognize causes of action grounded on
promissory estoppel as exemplified by [Section] 90 of Restatement, 1
Contracts? (2) Do the facts in this case make out a cause of action for
promissory estoppel? (3) Are the4 jury's findings with respect to
damages sustained by the evidence? '
The first two questions relate to liability and the third relates to damages.
1. Liability
The first question the court addressed was whether Wisconsin courts
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 272-73.
Id. at271.
Id. at271-72.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 272-73.
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should recognize causes of action under Section 90 of the Restatement (First)
of Contracts.42 Section 90 provides that "'[a] promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise."' 43 Prior to the Red Owl decision, no Wisconsin
court had adopted Section 90. 44 However, the court in Red Owl concluded
' 45
that promissory estoppel provided a "needed tool ... to prevent injustice
and, consequently, followed the precedent of courts in other states and
adopted Section 90.46
The second question before the court was whether the facts supported a
cause of action for promissory estoppel.47 The court ultimately determined
that there was ample evidence of numerous "promissory representations"
made by Red Owl and its agents to Hoffman and that Hoffman relied on the
representations "in the exercise of ordinary care. 4 8 After resolving those
fact-specific inquiries, the court made the discretionary policy decision to find
liability to prevent an injustice to the Hoffians.49
Red Owl contended that judicial intervention was inappropriate because
the parties never reached final agreement as to the "essential factors necessary
to establish a contract between Hoffman and Red Owl.

' 50

The court held that

Section 90 did not require a comprehensive and definite promise as a breach
of contract action did.51 Implicit in the court's analysis was that Red Owl
made a promise or a series of promises to Hoffman, however indefinite, but
the court failed to identify the specific promise or promises in its opinion.

42. Id. at 273.
43. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See, e.g., id at 273 n.l (citing Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (App. D.C. 1948);
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958); Van Hook v. S. Cal. Waiters Alliance, 323
P.2d 212 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958); LuskHarbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co., 145 So. 623 (Miss. 1933); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322
S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Schafer v. Fraser, 290 P.2d 190 (Or. 1955); N.W. Eng'g Co. v.
Ellerman, 10 N.W.2d 879 (S.D. 1943)); id. at 273-74 (citing People's Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v.
Linebarger Constr. Co., 240 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ark. 1951) (stating that the development of promissory
estoppel "is an attempt by the courts to keep remedies abreast of increased moral consciousness of
honesty and fair representations in all business dealings")).
47. Red Owl, 133 N.W.2d at 273.
48. Id. at 274.
49. Id. at 275.
50. Id. at 274.
51. Id. at 275. The court concluded that "it would be a mistake to regard an action grounded on
promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach of contract action." Id.
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Damages

While the court turned next to the jury's findings with respect to
damages, 52 it gave scant attention to the appropriate measure of damages in a
promissory estoppel case. 53 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the
lower court's judgment on damages, giving most of its attention to the order
for a new trial.54 The court agreed with the trial court that the damages
recommended by the jury for the Hoffmans' sale of their Wautoma store were
excessive, explaining that "[w]here damages are awarded in promissory
estoppel instead of specifically enforcing the promisor's promise, they should
be only such as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent
55
injustice.,
The Hoffmans purchased the store only to gain experience in the grocery
business. Consequently, the court did not find it appropriate to award them
their lost profits from the sale of the store because they had expected to sell
the store as soon as they opened their Red Owl franchise.5 6 The court held
that the correct measure of damages for the sale of the store was the actual
loss sustained by the Hoffmans, as measured by the "difference between the
sales price received and the fair market value of the assets sold, giving
consideration to any goodwill attaching thereto by reason of the transfer of a
going business. 57 Because neither side presented evidence at trial of the fair
market value of the assets sold, the court agreed with the trial court that a new
trial was warranted to determine the Hoffmans' damages from the sale of the
store.58
D.

The Aftermath

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin remanded the case to the trial court, and
the Hoffmans and Red Owl settled the case for $10,600 after a day and onehalf of trial.59 The Hoffmans received $6600 of the settlement, and their
attorney received $4000, with Red Owl paying two-thirds of the Hoffmans'
costs as ordered by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 60
Soon after
negotiations broke off with Red Owl, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
52. Id. at 274.
53. See id. at 275.
54. Id. at 275-77.
55. Id. at 276.
56. Id. at 277.
57. Id. at 276.
58. Id. at 277.
59. MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 9, at 403.
Outagamie County. Id.
60. Id.

The case was re-tried in the Circuit Court of
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(Metropolitan) hired Hoffman as an insurance salesman, and he quickly
received honors for having the most sales. 6' Metropolitan promoted him to
District Manager in Milwaukee and thereafter considered him for a
managerial position in Indiana.62 Hoffman and his family faded into
anonymity as the case that bore his name became, in perhaps an ironic twist,
subsequently known as Red Owl.
III. RED OWL'S INFLUENCE
Red Owl has exerted a pervasive influence on contract law. Although
identified by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin as a noncontractual theory,
promissory estoppel extends the contractual baseline of mutual promises or a
promise plus performance to cases in which there is no contract to enforce.
The court introduced a new lexicon for providing franchisees, employees, and
family members, among others, a remedy for unfulfilled precontractual
assurances and representations. Consequently, courts across the nation have
scrutinized the reasoning in Red Owl, looking for similarities and
dissimilarities to the cases before them. 63

Red Owl has influenced the

application of promissory estoppel to the formation
relationships and to legal relationships more generally.
A.

of franchising

Red Owl's Impact on FranchiseLaw

In invoking promissory estoppel as explicated in Section 90 of the
Restatement (First) of Contracts, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin created
new precedent. The court adopted a doctrine that partially protects the
interests of prospective franchisees who, without much bargaining power and
with much more at stake than franchisors, take economic risks in reliance on
precontractual assurances and representations.
By recognizing promissory estoppel as a valid cause of action, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin potentially altered the tone of negotiations
between franchisors and potential franchisees.
Previously, individuals
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Davis v. Univ. of Montevallo, 638 So. 2d 754, 758 (Ala. 1994); Alaska Bussell
Elec. Co. v. Vern Hickel Constr. Co., 688 P.2d 576, 581 (Alaska 1984); Kiely v. St. Germain, 670
P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1983); Vigoda v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 646 P.2d 900, 905 (Colo.
1982); Bender v. Design Store Corp., 404 A.2d 194, 196 (D.C. 1979); Olson v. Synergistic Tech.
Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 151 (Minn. 2001); Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, Inc., 526 N.W.2d
369, 372 (Minn. 1995); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992); Whorley
v. First Westside Bank, 485 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Neb. 1992); Cooke v. Blood Sys., Inc., 320 N.W.2d
124, 129 (N.D. 1982); E. Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, 239 A.2d 725, 727 (R.I. 1968); Farm
Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Nat'l Bank of Wash., 750 P.2d 231, 240 (Wash. 1988); Romberger v. VFW
Post 1881, 918 P.2d 993, 995 (Wyo. 1996); Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 349 (Wyo. 1993).
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seeking franchise agreements had little leverage in negotiations because the
franchisor controlled all terms and conditions. 64 Furthermore, the franchisor
could terminate negotiations at any point before (and at many points after)
signing the franchise agreement without fear of incurring liability. 65 The
court in Red Owl recognized that franchisors could abuse that bargaining
power without risk to themselves and provided a mechanism in promissory
estoppel to induce franchisors to live up to their precontractual assurances and
representations. 66 That mechanism protected potential franchisees who, to
their detriment, relied on a franchisor's precontractual statements.
Red Owl has been central to franchise law for nearly forty years.67 Courts
inside and outside of Wisconsin, both state and federal, have relied on and
cited Red Owl in cases testing the scope of a franchisor's responsibility to
potential franchisees. 68 For instance, in Walker v. KFC Corp.,69 a franchisee
filed suit against KFC for the franchisor's failure to keep certain promises,
such as developing a nationally recognized "Mexican McDonalds," providing

64. See generally Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618, 619 (7th Cir. 1940) (recognizing
"the wisdom and necessity of legislation which protects the weak against a suing party" when a
manufacturer unfairly cancels a motor vehicle dealer's franchise); Cut Price Super Mkts. v. Kingpin
Foods, Inc., 98 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. 1959); Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 71 N.W.2d 420, 423
(Wis. 1955) (acknowledging "the inequality in bargaining power between an automobile dealer and
an economically powerful manufacturer").
65. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability and PreliminaryAgreements:
FairDealing and FailedNegotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 (1987). Farnsworth notes:
[Clourts traditionally take a view of this precontractual period that relieves the parties of
the risk of any liability, whether contractual or not, and that results in a broad "freedom of
negotiation." As a general rule, a party to precontractual negotiations may break them off
without liability at any time and for any reason-a change of heart, a change of
circumstances, a better deal-or for no reason at all.
Id. The franchisor can avoid liability absent fraud or deceit. See id. at 233-34 ("A negotiating party
may not with impunity fraudulently misrepresent its intention to come to terms. Such an assertion is
one of fact-of a state of mind-and if fraudulent, it may be actionable in tort." (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 530 (1977)); see id. at 234 (citing Markov v. ABC
Transfer & Storage Co., 457 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1969)).
66. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Wis. 1965).
67. See, e.g., Durkee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 676 F. Supp. 189 (W.D. Wis. 1987);
Walker v. KFC Corp., 515 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1981); Wojciechowski v. Amoco Oil Co., 483 F.
Supp. 109 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Leistikow, 230 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 1975).
68. See, e.g., Beer Capitol Distrib., Inc. v. Guinness Bass Imp. Co., 290 F.3d 877 (7th Cir.
2002); Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publ'ns, Inc., 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993); Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale
& Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975); Lake Mich. Contractors v. Manitowoc Co., No. 1:00CV-787, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9547 (W.D. Mich. May 21, 2002); Davis v. Univ. of Montevallo,
638 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 1994).
69. 515 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 728 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir.
1984).
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equipment leases at competitive rates, and engaging in national advertising.7 °
The jury awarded the plaintiffs over $1,000,000 for actual reliance losses, lost
profits, and emotional distress. 71 The court, applying California law, denied
the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and allowed
the part of the jury's verdict that was grounded in promissory estoppel to
stand.72 The franchisee's attorneys presented, and the court accepted, an
argument based on the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's interpretation of
promissory estoppel in Red Owl: A court could enforce promises on which a
franchisee reasonably relies even if those promises are not part of a contract.73
Unlike Red Owl, however, the court premised liability on promissory estoppel
even though the franchisee had already been operating under a written
franchise agreement with KFC.74 Walker is illustrative of the ways in which
courts have cited Red Owl in finding noncontractual liability on the part of a
franchisor to a franchisee.
B. The BroaderImpact of Red Owl
Similarly, courts nationwide have cited Red Owl in promissory estoppel
cases, applying the doctrine to different types of business and potential
business relationships.75 For example, in Mooney v. Craddock,76 the court
cited Red Owl to hold that the plaintiff, who retired from the armed forces
after receiving assurances from the defendant that he could lease space to
operate a health club in a new office building, had a cause of action for
promissory estoppel even though the parties had no contractual relationship.77
Likewise, the court in Alaska Bussell Electric Co. v. Vern Hickel Construction
Co.78 enabled a contractor to recover from a subcontractor who did not fulfill
his bid on which the contractor relied in winning a construction contract.79
The court looked to Red Owl to decide whether the injustice presented by the
subcontractor's conduct required the type of relief that promissory estoppel
provides. 80

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 616.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 616.
Id.

75. See generally EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 428 (5th ed. 1997)

[hereinafter STUDIES].
76. 530 P.2d 1302 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
77. Id. at 1305.

78. 688 P.2d 576 (Alaska 1984).
79. Id. at 581.
80. See id.
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Red Owl's influence eventually reached the federal courts as well. In
Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Systems Development, Inc.,8 1 a supplier refused
to buy computers from a manufacturer because of a dispute over shipping
costs. 82 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized

that the supplier had provided assurances to the manufacturer that induced the
manufacture of the computers, and the manufacturer could reasonably have
expected the parties to agree on shipping costs because they had an ongoing
business relationship. 83 With mention of Red Owl and a federal appellate
court that cited it,84 the court invoked the theory of promissory estoppel to
avoid an injustice.
Many scholars have cited Red Owl in analyses of Section 90 of the First
and Second Restatements of Contracts.8 5 It has also been categorized in

81. 47 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995).
82. Id.at41.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 44. Courts have also cited Red Owl to articulate the appropriate measure of damages
in promissory estoppel cases. See, e.g., Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280 (7th
Cir. 1975); Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 704 A.2d 1321 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998).
85. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel,
ContractFormalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 489 (1987); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, PrecontractualReliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423, 444 (2001); Sidney
W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel:
Section 90 as Catch 22, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 943, 1016 (1997); Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, ClearSeeming Words: Some Realism About the New Formalism (with ParticularReference to Promissory
Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 24 (2001); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904
(1985); Farnsworth, supra note 65, at 236; Jay M. Feininan, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article,
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 305 (1992) [hereinafter Feinman, Promissory Estoppel]; Jay M.
Feinman, Promissory Estoppel andJudicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 694 (1984) [hereinafter
Feinman, JudicialMethod]; James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547, 606 (1995);
Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on PromissoryEstoppel: An Empirical and
Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 618 n.227 (1998); Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of
Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 296 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer
Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249,
1255 (1996); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 57 (1981); Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The
Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1213 (1998) [hereinafter Knapp, Rescuing
Reliance]; Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A
Default Rule for PrecontractualNegotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 640 (1993); Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Reshaping the PrecontractualLiability Debate: Beyond Short Run Economics, 58 U.
PITT. L. REV. 325, 340 (1997); Wallace K. Lightsey, A Critique of the Promise Model of Contract,
26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45, 52 n.38 (1984); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory
Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 84, 85 (1990); Nedzel, supra note 4, at 133;
David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory Estoppel, the Civil Law and the Mixed
Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 695, 740 (1998); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The
PromissoryBasis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 142 (1991); Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning
of PromissoryEstoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1263, 1268 (1994).
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86
several casebooks and treatises under the heading of promissory estoppel. 88
87 and Williston on Contracts
Franchise and DistributionLaw and Practice
both refer to Red Owl in their promissory estoppel sections,8 9 with the former
using the case as a specific example in the section defining "Reasonable
Reliance." 90 In the treatise Modern Law of Contracts, Professor Hunter
credits Red Owl for the revised definition of promissory estoppel found in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts,9 1 which adds the following to the prior
definition: "The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires. '92 The drafters added that clause to the original definition in an
attempt to recognize that in doing justice to the promisee, a court must be
careful not to do injustice to the promisor-an idea derived 9from
the
3
limitations on damages imposed by courts in cases such as Red Owl.
The court's decision in Red Owl has also given individuals and small
business owners a new vocabulary when trying to enforce noncontractual
promises made by corporations, even when courts ultimately deny relief. In
Major Mat Co. v. Monsanto Co.,94 a case decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, one plaintiff fell casualty to Red Owl. In
that case, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant promised to supply it with a
certain number of S-54 AstroTurf remnants for producing golf tee mats.95
After considering the elements of promissory estoppel as established in Red
Owl, the court held that the defendant's statement was a mere expression of
opinion or prediction of future availability. 96 The court therefore held that the
plaintiff could not receive damages for relying to its detriment on the
defendant's statement.97
While the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's decision in Red Owl seems to
contemplate applying promissory estoppel to mere assurances or statements of
opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
demanded evidence of a promise before entertaining a cause of action for

86. 2 W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:23

(2003); HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:12 (rev. ed. 1993); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:5 (3d ed. 2001).

87.
88.
89.
90.

2 GARNER, supra note 86.
WILLISTON, supra note 86.
Id. at § 8.5; 2 GARNER, supra note 86, at § 8:23.
2 GARNER, supra note 86, at § 8:23 n.l 1.

91. HUNTER, supra note 86.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See HUNTER, supra note 86, at § 6:12.
969 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
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promissory estoppel.98 Other courts have enforced only promises that are
definite enough to constitute offers if accepted. 99 The author of one contracts
casebook calls Red Owl the "'high water mark' in the development of
promissory estoppel,"' 0 0 as courts have scaled back the scope of the doctrine
ever since. Consequently, many courts that have cited Red Owl distinguish
the Wisconsin precedent.' 0' What we do not know, however, is how many
cases are settled because a plaintiff can articulate a claim for promissory
estoppel in the spirit of Red Owl, even though the claim never has to
withstand judicial scrutiny.
The real tragedy of Red Owl is that even courts in Wisconsin have limited
the potential reach of Red Owl and the promissory estoppel doctrine. For
instance, in Durkee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,102 the plaintiffs claimed
that they incurred marketing expenditures after the defendant made statements
giving them reason to anticipate receiving an exclusive dealership from the
defendant. 0 3 The Wisconsin federal district court, however, made a crucial
distinction between Red Owl and the case before it. The franchisor in Red
Owl told the plaintiffs that they had to rely on its assurances to get a franchise,
whereas the plaintiffs in Durkee were never told that receipt of the dealership
depended on them making the marketing expenditures. 104 The court narrowed
the Red Owl rubric so as to compensate prospective business owners only for
their detrimental reliance on specific, identifiable assurances made in
precontractual negotiations that certain expenditures would reap certain
rewards.
Two years after Red Owl, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin itself reduced

98. See, e.g., Beer Capitol Distrib., Inc. v. Guinness Bass Imp. Co., 290 F.3d 877 (7th Cir.
2002); Major Mat Co., 969 F.2d at 583; Landess v. Borden, Inc., 667 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1981).
99. See, e.g., Jungmann v. St. Regis Paper Co., 682 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1982) (requiring a clear
and definite agreement for an action in promissory estoppel); Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, 526
N.W.2d 369 (Minn. 1995) (reversing judgment of lower court because promise was not definite and
did not meet the requirements of a contractual offer); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622, 626 (Minn. 1983) (stating that a promise of particular terms, if in the form of an offer and if
accepted by the employee, is binding); Weitzman v. Steinberg, 638 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App. 1982)
(stating that promissory estoppel cannot substitute for essential contractual elements). But see
Whorley v. First Westside Bank, 485 N.W.2d 578 (Neb. 1992) (holding that reliance need only be
reasonable for action in promissory estoppel even if offer is indefinite); Keily v. St. Germain, 670
P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983) (stating that promissory estoppel does not rely on contractual principles and is
often appropriate when the parties have not mutually agreed on all essential elements of a contract).
100. STUDIES, supra note 75, at 475.
101. See, e.g.,
Owasso Dev. Co. v. Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 873 P.2d 212, 214 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1994); Prenger v. Baumhoer, 939 S.W.2d 23, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
102. 676 F. Supp. 189 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
103. Id. at 190.
104. See id at 192.

RED OWL'S LEGACY

2003]

the impact of its ruling on the bargaining position of prospective employees
and small businesses. In Forrerv. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 10 5 the plaintiff sued
his former employer under a theory of promissory estoppel after he was
discharged only four months after starting work.10 6 The employee alleged that
his former employer was liable for failing to provide "permanent
employment," which the employer had promised to the plaintiff if the plaintiff
abandoned his farming operations and accepted employment with the
defendant.10 7 By infusing words with, perhaps, their unintended meaning, the
court held that the promise of "permanent employment" only requires an
employer to hire an employee at will, a promise that the defendant made when
the plaintiff started working. 0 8 Although the plaintiff had previously worked
for the defendant for almost eighteen years before becoming ill and quitting,
and had allegedly lost over $11,000 in giving up his farming operations to
resume work for the defendant, justice did not require the court to invoke the
promissory estoppel doctrine. 0 9
Employees, who often have less bargaining power than employers, lost
the weapon of promissory estoppel in deciding whether to forgo the benefits
of prospective employment or to accept the benefits and risks of an at-will
relationship. Wisconsin courts continued to drain promissory estoppel of its
potency after Forrer. Partially as a consequence of Forrerand similar cases,
the full potential of Red Owl to bridge the gap in bargaining power between
individuals and big business was never realized. But perhaps that was to be
expected because promissory estoppel did not fit the facts in Red Owl.
IV. MOVING TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF RED OWL
None of the assurances Red Owl made to Joseph Hoffman during their

105.
106.
107.
108.

153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
See id. at 590. The court in Forrersaid:

Generally speaking, a contract for permanent employment, for life employment, or for
other terms purporting permanent employment, where the employee furnishes no
consideration additional to the services incident to the employment, amounts to an
indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party .... The presumption is
grounded on a policy that it would otherwise be unreasonable for a man to bind himself
permanently to a position, thus eliminating the possibility of later improving that position.
Moreover, a contract of permanent employment is by its very nature indefinite, and thus
any effort to interpret the duration of the contract and assess the amount of damages
becomes difficult.

Id.
109. See id. at 589-90.
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negotiations easily satisfied the threshold for promissory estoppel. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin appropriated the doctrine of promissory estoppel
despite the misfit to alleviate some of the Hoffmans' financial losses. 1t 0 The
court stretched the limits of promissory estoppel in Red Owl, which
subsequent courts would soon narrow. Beneath the surface of the opinion,
however, it appears that the court appropriated a more relevant theory.
Perhaps at the core of the court's opinion-but which the court did not
articulate-was the imposition of a duty on the part of franchisors to negotiate
with prospective franchisees in good faith.
A.

The MissingPromise

Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin grounded its decision in Red
Owl on promissory estoppel, the court begged the question of what the
actionable promise made by the franchisor to Hoffman was. The Restatement
(First)of Contracts specifically distinguishes a promise from a "statement of
intention or of opinion and from a mere prophecy.""1 1 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts clarifies the definition of a promise as a manifestation
of intent by the promisor to be bound. 1 2 It appears that Red Owl did not
promise the Hoffmans a franchise but merely suggested its intention to extend
one to them if they satisfied certain conditions. Some courts citing Red Owl
have commented 1on
the absence of any enforceable promise made by Red
13
Hoffman.
to
Owl
The court pointed to a number of promises and assurances made by Red
Owl, including: 1) Hoffman needed invest only $18,000 to begin a Red Owl
franchise; 2) if Hoffman sold the Wautoma grocery store, he would be
operating a bigger Red Owl store by fall; and 3) Hoffman selling his bakery
building was the final obstacle to obtaining a Red Owl franchise." 4 However,
the court described no evidence that Red Owl promised Hoffman a franchise
if he invested $18,000 or later if he sold his Wautoma grocery store and
bakery building. Further, some argue that individuals contemplating franchise
110. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 85, at 143 ("The court may have found a promise, however,
because it saw no other basis on which to hold for Hoffman, shoehorning the facts into Section 90 in
order to afford Hoffman some relief for what the trial judge apparently regarded as (negligent)
misrepresentation by Red Owl's agent." (footnotes omitted)).
111. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 2, cmt. c (1932).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981) ("A promise is a manifestation of
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made.").
113. See, e.g., State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Mich. 1993)
("[P]romissory estoppel has been used to enforce promises too indefinite or incomplete to constitute
valid offers." (citing Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Wis. 1965))).
114. Red Owl, 133 N.W.2d at 274.
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relationships realize that precontractual negotiations do not give rise to a
franchise, and the assurances and representations are only part of those
negotiations." 5 If Hoffman knew that Lukowitz did not have the authority to
extend a Red Owl franchise, he should have realized that Lukowitz's
statements were simply expressions of opinion. While those arguments
overlook that Hoffman might have lacked a subjective appreciation for the
legal effect of Red Owl's assurances and representations, a focus on such
subjectivity would require subsequent courts to try to ascertain the state of
mind of parties involved in precontractual negotiations. Such focus only
magnifies the difficulties of applying Red Owl to other cases.
The misalignment between promissory estoppel and the facts of Red Owl
is also apparent in how the court measured damages.' 1 6 The court declared
that awarding damages for promissory estoppel did not necessitate
"[m]echanical or rule of thumb approaches." '"17 The court cited Professors
Corbin' 1 8 and Seavey 19 to assert that damages must be based on the plaintiffs
"'reliance as well as by the value to him of the promised performance
[expectancy]."" 120 Further, the court found that the ultimate decision as to
damage awards in promissory estoppel cases resided in judges' equitable
powers, 1 a finding that enabled courts to award damages as they saw fit in such
cases.

12

Courts usually award successful plaintiffs reliance damages in promissory
estoppel cases.122 However, the Red Owl court did not fully protect the
Hoffmans' reliance interest;1 23 otherwise, the court would have instructed the
115. See, e.g., Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the "Fat Lady" Sing?: An Analysis of
"Agreements in Principle" in CorporateAcquisitions, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 125, 128 (1986).
116. See Red Owl, 133 N.W.2d at 276-77.
117. Id. at 276.
118. Id. at 276-77 (citing ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 200, at 221 (1963)).
119. Id. (citing Warren A. Seavey, Reliance on Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64
HARV. L. REv. 913, 926 (1951)).
120. Id.at 277 (quoting ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 200, at 221 (1963)).
121. Id. at 276-77.
122. See, e.g., Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., 98 Civ. 861, 98 Civ. 3607, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2003) (recognizing promissory estoppel as a cause of action
with emphasis on both the contractual requirement of a promise (equivalent to an offer) and its
equitable purpose to avoid injustice through the award of reliance damages); Wyatt v. Bellsouth, Inc.,
18 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (D. Ala. 1998) (stating reliance damages are appropriate measure for an action
in promissory estoppel); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1982) (limiting
relief in promissory estoppel case to reliance damages).
123. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1,
46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) (categorizing the three different measures of contracts damages: reliance,
expectation, and restitution). Reliance damages compensate victims of breach of contract for their
out-of-pocket losses. In other words, instead of putting the victim where he or she would have been
had the contract been performed (the expectancy interest), the court compensates him or her for
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trial judge to award the Hoffmans their lost profits from the sale of the
Wautoma grocery store. The Hoffmans' reliance on Red Owl's assurance that
they would be in a bigger store by fall if they sold their grocery store caused
them to lose the store profits from the busy summer season, making the sale
fiscally detrimental without a franchise to offset such losses. Nor did the
court award the Hoffmans their expectation damages,124 even though some
scholars have acknowledged that protecting a promissee's expectancy interest
is appropriate in cases of promissory estoppel.125 The Hoffmans' expectancy
interest included their anticipated profits from the operation of a Red Owl
franchise, discounted to their present value. The court made no overtures that
the trial court should have included those lost profits in its measure of
damages.
Instead of a reliance or expectation measure, the court purported to follow
a formula dictated by the trial court: reliance damages except to compensate
the Hoffmans for the sale of the Wautoma grocery store, for which the court
instructed the trial court to award the difference between the fair market value
of the Wautoma grocery store inventory and fixtures and the sale price of the
assets, plus goodwill. 126 Another symptom of the court's incoherent measure
of damages is that it counted goodwill from the sale of the grocery store
twice. Goodwill is necessarily included in the fair market value of assets sold
as part of a going concern; but the court tacked on goodwill again at the endperhaps in an attempt to increase the Hoffmans' damages. While the court
found its measure of damages necessary to prevent an injustice to the
Hoffmans, its measure did not mesh with either of the two approaches to
damages traditionally used in promissory estoppel cases.
B. The UnarticulatedDuty
A more fitting rationale for the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's opinion in
Red Owl might be that the court was imposing a duty to negotiate in good
faith on franchisors.
Although the Uniform Commerical Code, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and the common law impose a duty of
good faith on parties to contractual relationships, 127 courts traditionally have
losses caused by relying on the contract. See generally Sec. Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Rys. Express
Co., 51 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932); MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 9, at 114.
124. See Fuller & Purdue, supra note 123, at 54 (stating expectation damages put the promisee
in as good a position as had the contract been performed).
125. See Red Owl, 133 N.W.2d at 277 n.3 (noting one source that expresses this "opposite
view" that courts in promissory estoppel cases should award expectation damages).

126. Id. at 276-77.
127. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003) ("Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code]
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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not imposed an obligation of good faith on parties engaging in precontractual
negotiations. 128 At common law, as long as the franchisor's conduct did not
give rise to a cause of action for fraud or misrepresentation, there were no
limitations on the franchisor's precontractual statements to prospective
franchisees.129 In Hoffman's case, the only way to obtain a Red Owl
franchise was to follow through with the company's requests. Unfortunately
for Hoffman, that cost him time, energy, and-most importantly-money, and
he never received the reward of the franchise. 30 The court wanted to respond
to Hoffman's sympathetic situation, but had no tool rooted in good faith to do
SO.
In substance, the court was not rectifying a broken promise but rather
holding Red Owl accountable for proffering a series of faulty assurances
during negotiations-for advising Hoffman to sell a profitable store, buy a
piece of land, and move his family-and for abusing its bargaining power to
mislead a hard-working Wisconsin man.' 3' The justices recognized that
people often incur substantial damages even before a formal contract comes to
fruition. Essentially, the court wanted to label Red Owl's behavior as
tortuous, but it lacked a theory on which to base the Hoffmans' recovery. The
court chose to rely on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a doctrine accepted
by the Restatement and many other jurisdictions' 32-- even though it could not
discern a true promise-rather than elect to set a precedent for requiring good
faith in precontractual negotiations.
The court even hinted at such a good-faith rationale in its opinion. Chief
Justice Currie, writing for the court, quoted an Arkansas court that stated:
"[T]he law of promissory estoppel... 'is an attempt by the courts to keep
remedies abreast of increased moral consciousness of honesty and fair
representations in all business dealings."1 3 3 Such reference to assessing
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair

dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").
128. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. U.M.C.O. Int'l Corp., 748 F. Supp. 1557, 1563 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (stating that although American law traditionally does not adopt culpa in contrahendo, cases
such as Red Owl show that there may be a trend toward the inclusion of this civil law doctrine in
United States courts).
129. See Farnsworth, supra note 65.
130. See MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 9, at 320-23.

13 1. See Temkin, supra note 115, at 45 (stating that Hoffman had "a particularly sympathetic
case").
132. See Red Owl, 133 N.W.2d at 273 (discussing how the idea of adopting promissory
estoppel surfaced in Wisconsin in Lazarus v. American Motors Corp., 123 N.W.2d 548, 552-53 (Wis.
1963), but the facts of the case did not require adopting § 90 at that time.); see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
133. Id. at 273-74 (quoting People's Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Linebarger Constr. Co., 240
S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ark. 1951)).
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morality in "all business dealings"-not just those that occur in the context of
a contractual relationship-supports the notion that the court, in part, found
34
Red Owl liable for acting in bad faith during pre-contractual negotiations.'
C. The Court Chose the Weaker Vessel
By finding Red Owl liable under a theory of promissory estoppel, despite
perhaps the case's greater similarities to a tort case about good faith, the court
chose the weaker vessel. Though several sources believe that the decision
created a duty to negotiate in good faith, 35 the court's avoidance of the term
limited the usefulness of Red Owl as precedent for imposing a good-faith
duty.
It is possible that the Wisconsin Supreme Court intended to stop short of
creating such a duty. Perhaps it wanted to respond to the sympathetic set of
facts in Red Owl without creating new law. Indeed, for the court to adopt a
precontractual duty to negotiate in good faith-a notion implicit only in civil
law systems-would have been revolutionary. 136 Furthermore, it is possible
that the court wanted to prescribe limitations on the scope of liability arising
out of precontractual negotiations. Franchisors are typically large companies
likely to have a measurable impact on a state's economy. 137 If the court had

134. See id.
135. E.g., Temkin, supra note 115, at 145 (stating that many scholars believe that the case
stands for this proposition).
136. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. U.M.C.O. Int'l Corp., 748 F. Supp. 1557, 1562 (S.D. Fla.
1990). The Whirlpool court stated:
United States law is not unaware of the underlying values of good faith and of the doctrine
of culpa in contrahendo. Case law acknowledges precontractual liability on grounds
similar to those applied by civil law in notions of good faith and culpa in contrahendo,
through the legal institutions of"promissory estoppel."
Id. (citations omitted).
137. See, e.g., Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealey, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373 (Ct. App. 1996).
The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is a significant issue, and growing more
important each year. As recently explained, "Franchising is rapidly becoming the dominant
mode of distributing goods and services in the United States. According to the International
Franchise Association, one out of every twelve businesses in the United States is a
franchise. In addition, franchise systems now employ over eight million people and
account for approximately forty-one percent of retail sales in the United States. Even
conservative estimates predict that franchised businesses will be responsible for over fifty
percent of retail sales by the year 2000."
Id. (quoting David Hess, The Iowa FranchiseAct: Towards ProtectingReasonable Expectations of
Franchisees and Franchisors,80 IOWA L. REV. 333 (1995)); see also id (citing STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON SMALL BuS., 101ST CONG., FRANCHISING IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: PROSPECTS AND
PROBLEMS 16 (Comm. Print 1990)).
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created a duty to negotiate in good faith, a rather broad duty, the court likely
would have alarmed franchisors and initiated an influx of litigation from
disgruntled prospective business owners alleging bad faith. Instead, the court
chose a more malleable doctrine in promissory estoppel, a doctrine enabling
the court and other courts to distinguish Red Owl easily.
Pragmatists rightly claim that the Red Owl court refrained from judicial
lawmaking. When faced with a set of circumstances that were blatantly
unjust, the court appropriated the best doctrine available to achieve the desired
result rather than create new law. Defenders might also argue that the court
could not rule on an issue not raised by the parties in the trial court, but courts
do so all of the time.
The court and the state of Wisconsin would have been better served if the
court had explicitly ruled on the basis of good faith. Even if the court was
reacting sympathetically to the Hoffmans' situation, 138 it did not sufficiently
protect prospective franchisees and may instead have worsened their position.
First, franchisors can easily circumvent the doctrine of promissory estoppel by
requiring prospective franchisees to sign a preliminary document releasing the
franchisor from liability unless and until the parties sign a written contract.
The franchisor can then continue to make assurances, such as those made in
Red Owl, and maintain its bargaining power in precontractual negotiations.
Unless a court in those circumstances imports the nonwaivable precontractual
duty to negotiate in good faith, a prospective franchisee has no protection
against a franchisor's precontractual statements and assertions.
Second, rather than require the aforementioned waivers, franchisors can
simply use greater discretion in choosing prospective franchisees. Instead of
contracting around liability, franchisors can protect themselves from the
outset by disqualifying candidates who do not have sufficient capital or other
resources to open a franchise. Such a practice, however, would disqualify
successful entrepreneurs who could raise the money or fulfill other
requirements for a new franchise over the course of a longer negotiation
process. This practice also would prevent franchisors from negotiating with
certain applicants willing to operate in a remote location or fill another niche.
Consequently, when the court in Red Owl held the franchisor liable under the
pretense of enforcing a promise, it likely hurt prospective franchisees as much
as it helped them.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Red Owl made additional costly
mistakes when it compromised on the issue of damages. The decision fell
short of compensating the Hoffmans for all of the losses they suffered as a
result of Red Owl's unfair negotiating tactics. The court neither awarded
138. See Temkin, supra note 115.
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them expectation damages-the profits they would have received if they had
obtained a franchise-nor did the court give them reliance damages. The
limitations on damages imposed by the court likely precipitated the parties'
settlement for only $10,600. Of the total damages, the Hoffmans received
$6600; their lawyer received $40001 39 This modest compensation likely
would not encourage anyone in Hoffman's position to sue a franchisor for
faulty assurances. Along the same line, franchisors that prefer to negotiate as
Red Owl did would be undeterred by such pitiful monetary consequences.
While prevailing in the lawsuit might have satisfied Hoffman and his attorney,
imposing a duty in tort enabling Hoffman to recover all of his foreseeable
damages would have provided him greater recovery.
Even if the court had used an expectation measure of recovery, it still
could have denied the Hoffmans their lost profits, finding that future profits
were too uncertain and speculative. Similarly, under an expectation measure,
the Hoffmans could not have recovered for their emotional distress or other
non-monetary injuries resulting from the failed negotiations with Red Owl.
Punitive damages would also not have been an option even if Red Owl had
intentionally negotiated in bad faith. If the court had grounded recovery in
tort, the Hoffmans would have been entitled to all damages that were
proximately caused by Red Owl's conduct, and they would have had a
stronger claim to lost profits and non-monetary and punitive damages.
V. RE-WRITING RED OWL AS A GOOD-FAITH DECISION
Although the majority of scholars, casebook authors, and courts reference
Red Owl for the court's invocation of promissory estoppel, 40 the decision
stirred as much debate over what the justices did not say as over what they did
say. A closer study of the opinions and writings of courts and scholars who
have cited Red Owl as establishing a precontractual duty to negotiate in good

139. MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 9, at 334.

140. See, e.g., Beer Capitol Distrib., Inc. v. Guinness Bass Imp. Co., 290 F.3d 877 (7th Cir.
2002); Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publ'ns, Inc., 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993); Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale
& Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975); Lake Mich. Contractors v. Manitowoc Co., No. 1:00CV-787, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9547 (W.D. Mich. May 21, 2002); Davis v. Univ. of Montevallo,
638 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 1994); Farnsworth, supra note 65, at 236; Feinman, Judicial Method, supra
note 85, at 694 ("Emphasizing the importance of good faith in negotiations and of protecting the
reliance interest even in the face of limited commitment, [Red Owl] and subsequent cases have
enforced what are actually conditional promises."); Feinman, PromissoryEstoppel, supra note 85, at
315; Snyder, supra note 85, at 749; Gordley, supra note 85, at 606; Stanley D. Henderson,
PromissoryEstoppel and TraditionalContractDoctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 359 (1969); Katz, supra
note 85, at 1255; Knapp, Rescuing Reliance, supra note 85, at 1243; Metzger & Phillips, supra note
85, at 854-55; Yorio & Thel, supra note 85, at 142-43.
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faith 141 draws valid questions as to how to interpret the court's opinion.
A.

InterpretingRed Owl as a Good-FaithDecision

In Whirlpool Corp. v. U.MC.O. InternationalCorp.,142 the court cited Red
Owl to show that the civil law concept of an implied, precontractual duty to
negotiate in good faith has appeared in United States case law. 143 In addition,
several casebook authors include Red Owl in their sections on good faith and
fair dealing.144 For example, Profesor Kessler and his coauthors of Contracts.
Cases and Materials comment that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Red
Owl premised liability on the basis of the subtle bad faith that Red Owl
exhibited when it failed to act consistently with or promptly withdraw both a
"rash promise" regarding the investment needed to begin a franchise and post-

141. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. U.M.C.O. Int'l Corp., 748 F. Supp. 1557, 1562 (S.D. Fla.
1990); Pappas Indus. Parks, Inc. v. Psarros, 511 N.E.2d 621, 622-23 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (calling
Red Owl the classic case of "stringing along"); Michael H. Cohen, Reconstructing Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1291, 1318 (1985)
(stating that Red Owl "suggests that the implied covenant [of good faith] could extend into the
negotiating process even before a firm offer is made"); Henderson, supra note 140, at 358-59;
Temkin, supra note 115, at 145 (commenting that many scholars believe Red Owl stands for
requiring good faith in precontractual negotiations, but noting that Hoffman himself was a very
sympathetic plaintiff and that the court likely would not have come to the same result in the case of a
corporate plaintiff). See also P. S.Atiyeh, Book Review, The Principlesof Social Order. Selected
Essays of Lon L. Fuller, Edited with an Introduction by Kenneth I. Winston, 1983 DUKE L. J. 669,
685 (1983), in which the author states:
It clearly follows from the court's decision that Red Owl owed a duty not to cause loss by
failure to bargain in good faith, but it is hardly plausible to say that this duty arose from
defendant's intentions or from the parties' private ordering. It arose from the court's
perception of the requirements of good faith, even if this in turn was derived from normal
understanding of commercial behavior.
Id; see also Comment, Reliance Losses: Promissory Estoppel as a Basis of Recovery for Breach of
Agreement to Agree: Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 51 CORNELL L. Q. 351, 353-56 (1966). But
see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 24

(1981).
142. 748 F. Supp. 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
143. Id.
144. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG & LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 576 (7th ed. 2001)
(citing Red Owl in section entitled "Preliminary Negotiations, Indefiniteness, and the Duty to Bargain
in Good Faith"); FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 223-25 (3d ed.

1990) (citing Red Owl in section entitled "Good Faith." The authors explain that Red Owl is a subtle
example of bad faith found in failure to promptly withdraw a rash promise and post-promise
assurances about future performance.); STUDIES, supra note 75, at 182, 421, 428, 775 (citing Red
Owl in sections entitled, "Insufficient or Defective Formulation of Agreement" and "The Duty of
Good Faith." In the latter section, the authors state, "[Tihere are fitful signs that some courts will
impose more substantive duties of good faith in pre-contractual negotiations," and cite to Red Owl
for that proposition.).
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promise assurances regarding future performance.145 Furthermore, they argue
that the Red Owl court used promissory estoppel to fill a gap left by the tort
law of fraud. 14 6 In Studies in Contract Law, Professor Murphy and his
coauthors declare Red Owl to be the furthest advance of contract law into the
regulation of precontractual negotiations, noting that the decision shows
"fitful signs that some courts will impose more substantive duties of good
faith in pre-contractual negotiations.' 4 7 The casebook also mentions that Red
Owl wandered into territory that neither Section 1-203 of the UCC nor Section
205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contractsaddresses.148
B. Red Owl's Legacy
Despite such interpretations, courts and scholars cite to Red Owl (roughly
90% of the time) as an example of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's
invocation of promissory estoppel. If the court intended to impose a duty to
negotiate in good faith on franchisors, the duty was unarticulated, which
undermined, if not destroyed, the precedential value of Red Owl for creating
such a duty. Consequently, the potential of the court's opinion to alter the
dynamics of business relationships remains untapped. Yet the untapped
potential of the case does not lessen the court's boldness in finding a
corporate franchisor liable to a prospective, relatively powerless, franchisee.
Perhaps, then, it is not necessary to criticize the court's decision in Red
Owl for what it failed to accomplish. Rather, we should laud the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin for exposing the economic inequities between
corporations and individuals, franchisors and franchisees, and employers and
employees. Further, the court gave lawyers the vocabulary of promissory
estoppel to fight to protect other individuals, franchisees, and employees
while, at the same time, introducing the undercurrent of a duty to negotiate in
good faith into the common law.
While the court could have more
fundamentally addressed the imbalance of bargaining power in precontractual
negotiations, it did not, and we will never know why. Consequently, although
we might desire to rewrite the court's decision in Red Owl to impose a duty of
good faith in precontractual negotiations, such revisionist history takes
attention away from the real legacy of the case.
Many first-year law students read the decision of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.-and those who do not should.
The case illustrates how contract law is more about continuing relationships

145. See KESSLER ET AL., supra note 144, at 223-25.
146. See id
147. See STUDIES, supra note 75, at 775.

148. See id.at 428.
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than discrete transactions, how the law is as realistic as it is formalistic, how it
is just as much about policy as it is about doctrine, and how it is less about
bright-line rules and more about malleable doctrine. The case raises debates
about the role that courts play and should play in American society-the
intersection between law, society, and the economy. Sometimes the best
legacy is the unintended one. For that legacy, current and future generations
of law students and professors should be grateful.
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